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Abstract
We review some of the common methods for model selection1: the goodness of
fit, the likelihood ratio test, Bayesian model selection using Bayes factors, and
the classical as well as the Bayesian information theoretic approaches. We illus-
trate these different approaches by comparing models for the expansion history
of the Universe. In the discussion we highlight the premises and objectives en-
tering these different approaches to model selection and finally recommend the
information theoretic approach.
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1The expression “model selection” sometimes “model choice” is well established. In physics “model com-
parison” is presumably more appropriate, but we will stick with the de facto standard.
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1 Introduction
In science we often have several competing theoretical models which try to explain the same
natural phenomenon. Based on measured data we want to decide which model is the better
one. As an example we consider two different cosmological models, a cold dark matter model
(CDM) with a cosmological constant Λ called ΛCDM, and a cold dark matter model with a
constant equation of state p = w% for the dark energy component called wCDM . With both
models we try to explain observations like the cosmic microwave background, galaxy cluster
counts, supernovae distance measurements, to name only a few. Models with more parameters
typically allow for a closer fit of the data, but are such models with more parameters indeed
better (see Fig. 1)? In such a context one often refers to Ockham’s razor that one should not
introduce additional parameters if they are not needed2. One task of model selection is to
make this statement quantitative.
To set a well defined stage, consider some measured data points di = (xi, yi) with i ∈
{1, . . . , N}. A model is providing a function f(x,θ) such that f(xi,θ) is approximating yi for
each i. The parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θK) are from A ⊂ RK . For simplicity we assume that
x, xi, yi ∈ R and also f(x,θ) is real valued3. The best fitting parameters θ? ∈ A ⊂ RK of
the model are then determined from a Bayesian approach, a maximum likelihood procedure,
or a simple least–square–fit. If one considers only a single model and has a good idea about
the priors for the parameters, then many physicists would agree that a Bayesian parameter
estimation procedure is the appropriate thing to do (see [2]).
The situation is more complicated if one considers at least one other model g(x,φ) with
parameters φ ∈ B ⊂ RL. For simplicity we name the models after the functions f and
g. Typically the dimensions of the parameter spaces differ L 6= K and also the parameter
spaces may not overlap. We can determine the optimal parameters θ? and φ? for each of the
models f and g. But the question remains, which of the models is “better”. This situation is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
As a starting point we will briefly discuss some of the common methods used for parameter
estimation. Then we will present methods used for the selection of models and also comment
on the approximations and numerical methods used. In section 3 we use these methods to
compare two models for the expansion history of the Universe. In the discussion we highlight
the premises and objectives entering the different approaches and recommend the informa-
tion theoretic procedure, preferably in its Bayesian flavour. In appendix A we summarise
properties of statistical tests, the empirical distribution function, and the Kullback-Leibler
divergence. In appendix B we provide some details of the numerical implementation and in
2Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate. Attributed to William of Ockham and sometimes
earlier to Duns Scotus. See Thorburn [1] for an historical account.
3Choosing a real valued f and real x, xi, yi is done for notational simplicity. We could choose a more
complex mapping without touching the following arguments.
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Figure 1: Three polynomials fitted to 10 data points: f(x,θ) = θ0 + θ1x (solid blue line),
g(x,φ) = φ0 +φ1x+φ2x
2 (dashed red line) h(x,ψ) = ψ0 +ψ1x+ψ2x
2 +ψ3x
3 +ψ4x
4 +ψ5x
5
(dotted green line). Which of these polynomials is the “best” model (see also Munroe [3])?
appendix C we discuss the application and especially the error budget in more detail. We
assume some familiarity with statistical methods used in physics and cosmology (see for ex-
ample [4, chap. 40] for a short review). A comprehensive introduction to statistics including
model selection is Wassermann [5]. An introduction to model selection with a focus on the
information theoretic approach is Burnham & Anderson [6]. Most of the material shown here
is not new. Some of the results are scattered throughout the literature so we try to present
them in a coherent fashion and give due reference.
1.1 Parameter estimation
In the following we will give a short review of different methods for parameter estimation.
The starting point for a comparison of a model with the data is in most cases the likelihood.
To specify the likelihood function pf (d |θ), the model itself f(x,θ) and an error model for the
data is needed. The vector of measurements is d = (xi, yi)
N
i=1 and pf (d |θ) is the probability
of obtaining the measured data points d, given the parameters θ in the model f . Often one
assumes Gaussian errors, then the likelihood reads
pf (d |θ) = 1
((2pi)N det(Σ))
1
2
exp
[−12(y − f(x,θ))TΣ−1(y − f(x,θ))] (1)
with y = (y1, . . . , yN )
T , x = (x1, . . . , xN )
T , f(x,θ) = (f(x1,θ), . . . , f(xN ,θ))
T and the
covariance matrix Σ. With a maximum likelihood estimator we determine the parameters
θ? which are maximising pf (d |θ?). Hence in choosing the parameter θ?, the data points d
become the most probable data points given the model f .
3
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The least square method is a simplified version of the maximum likelihood estimator [7].
The likelihood is assumed to be Gaussian with a diagonal Σ and the σi’s on the diagonal.
Searching the maximum of pf (d |θ), or of
log pf (d |θ) = −N2 log(2pi)− 12 log(det(Σ))− 12
N∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi,θ))2
σ2i
(2)
gives the same result as searching for the minimum of
χ2f =
N∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi,θ))2
σ2i
. (3)
This minimum determines the best parameters θ∗ of the least square fit.
In a Bayesian setting we also need the prior distribution pf (θ) of the parameters for model
f . Using Bayes theorem we can determine the posterior distribution
pf (θ |d) = pf (d |θ) pf (θ)
pf (d)
, (4)
the distribution of the parameters θ, given the data d and the model f . Contrary to the
posterior distribution pf (θ |d), the likelihood pf (d |θ) is the distribution of the data d given
the parameters θ of the model f . The normalisation pf (d) is called the evidence or marginal
likelihood. The evidence can be obtained by an integration in parameter space
pf (d) =
∫
pf (d |θ) pf (θ)dθ. (5)
Given the data and the model, the evidence is a normalisation constant of the posterior
distribution. Hence, we do not need to calculate the evidence if we want to determine the
maximum θA or the mean of the posterior distribution pf (θA |d) only. The maximum4
θA is called the maximum posterior (MAP) estimate. Clearly, there is more to parameter
estimation than we covered here. We did not discuss how to choose priors, how to deal with
nuisance parameters, or how to determine confidence or credibility regions. Nevertheless we
provided the necessary prerequisites to be able to discuss model selection.
2 Model selection
Quite a few methods for model selection have been developed. Cosmological and astrophysical
oriented reviews and books are for example [8], [9] [10]. A more philosophically inclined
introduction with basic examples can be found in Sober [11, chapter 1].
2.1 The goodness of fit
The so called “goodness of fit” may serve as a starting point for this discussion, since it is
often the first method students of physics learn in their lab–courses. One calculates the so
called reduced χ2f,red
χ2f,red =
χ2f
ndf
(6)
4The different “best” parameter estimates receive different stars as labels: θ∗ (least–square) θ? (maximum–
likelihood), θA (MAP).
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where χ2f is calculated using eq. (3) with the best fit parameters θ
∗ of the model. ndf is
the number of degrees of freedom, typically ndf = N − K, with N the number of data
points and K the number of parameters in the model f . If χ2f,red ≈ 1, this is considered
a good fit, if χ2f,red > 1 a bad fit and if χ
2
f,red < 1 an overfit. Remember, one starts with
a maximum likelihood estimate and makes assumptions about the data- and error-model
which are often stark oversimplifications. As a remedy the number of degrees of freedom is
determined from the “effective” number of independent data points. The problems of this
approach are summarised in [12].
Some of the motivation for using the χ2f derives from the theory of statistical tests (see [13]
or [10]). The p–value used in these tests is calculated as
p = 1−Gndf(χ2f ), (7)
with Gndf the cumulative probability distribution function of a χ
2 distributed random variable
with ndf degrees of freedom (see appendix A). Clearly p is one-to-one with χ
2
f . The p–value
indicates how incompatible the data are with our null hypothesis (our model including the
error model, [14]). The smaller the p–value, the greater is the statistical incompatibility of the
data with the null hypothesis. Hence, given the model (the null hypothesis), a small p–value
allows us to reject the model using a statistical test. From the p–value however we do not
learn anything about the false negative rate (see appendix A). The p–value is a statement
about data in relation to a specified hypothetical explanation (our model), not about the
data itself, and especially not about other models. See the recent statement of the American
Statistical Association on the (restricted) applicability of p–values [14].
Whether an alternative hypothesis/model is needed, was one of the issues in the debate
about hypothesis testing between Fisher on one side and Neyman and Pearson on the other
side (see Lehmann [15] for a breakdown of the arguments). With respect to the importance
of the false negative rate and the specification of an alternative hypothesis we side here with
Neymann and Pearson (see the following section 2.2).
2.2 Likelihood ratio test
For the selection of models Neyman and Pearson [16] developed the likelihood ratio test. As
usual we first consider so called nested models. The model f with parameter space A is a
special case of the model g with parameter space B. More formally A ( B and f |A ≡ g|A
restricted to A. Now we determine the best fitting parameter θ? ∈ A, and φ? ∈ B and
calculate
L =
pf (d |θ?)
pg(d |φ?) . (8)
Our null hypothesis is “f is the true model with θ? ∈ A”. The alternative is “g is the true
model with φ? ∈ B but φ? 6∈ A”. With these maximum likelihood estimates θ?, and φ?
we calculate L. Fixing a significance level 0 < α < 1 one can proceed and specify the test.
Often one relies on Wilk’s theorem [17]: for nested models and for large sample sizes N the
λ = −2 logL is approximately χ2–distributed with the number of degrees of freedom equal
to ν = dim(B) − dim(A). The p–value is calculated as p = 1 − Gν(λ). We reject our null
hypothesis if p < α with a predefined significance level α (see the appendix A). Contrary to
the situation discussed with the goodness of fit, the alternative hypothesis is fully specified in
the likelihood ratio test. The false negative rate5 is the probability that the true alternative
5The false negative rate is also called the type II or β error.
5
SciPost Physics Lecture Notes 2 MODEL SELECTION
hypothesis (our model g) gets rejected. The Neyman-Pearson–Lemma [16] tells us that a test
based on the likelihood ratio is minimising the false negative rate. In this sense the likelihood
ratio test is optimal.
In the introduction we already considered a more general, non-nested setting. Vuong [18]
discusses the likelihood ratio test for overlapping or non-nested models and he derives the
relevant limiting distribution (not necessarily a χ2-distribution anymore). The application of
the likelihood ratio test in this more general setting is reviewed by Lewis et al. [19].
2.3 Bayesian model selection
Bayesian methods, like the evidence and Bayes factors are nowadays frequently used to com-
pare cosmological models (see for example [20], [21], [22], and [23]). The definition of the
evidence in eq. (5)
pf (d) =
∫
pf (d |θ) pf (θ)dθ
tells us that pf (d) is the conditional probability of obtaining the data vector d given the model
f . For some simple models the evidence can be calculated and a suggestive interpretation
emerges [20], but in most cases the evidence of one model by itself is not very informative.
Its usefulness derives from the evidence ratio used in Bayesian model selection.
If we consider another model g we may compare its evidence with the evidence of the model
f . For a consistent comparison of models within a Bayesian framework we need the joint
probability p(f andd) = pf (d)pif of model f and data d. Similarly for p(g andd) = pg(d)pig
of model g and the same data d. The pif and pig are the prior probabilities we assign to
our models. Often these probabilities are chosen equal pif = pig, and the ratio of the full
probabilities
p(f andd)
p(g andd)
=
pf (d)pif
pg(d)pig
=
pf (d)
pg(d)
=: Bfg (9)
reduces to the evidence ratio, also called Bayes factor. A Bfg larger than unity suggests, that
we should favour model6 f over model g.
The Bayes factor, as any result from a Bayesian analysis, explicitly depends on the prior
distributions for the parameters of the models. You may have prior knowledge that allows
you to specify a so called “subjective” prior [24]. Practitioners often use priors suggested
by results from preceding observations or studies. Different approaches are used to motivate
the so called “objective”, “non-informative”, or “reference” priors. Their definition can be
based on the principle of insufficient reasoning, the maximum entropy principle, the invariance
under transformations or scaling, or the missing information principle (see e.g. [25], [26], [27]).
Kass & Wassermann [28] provide an overview and rules for selecting among these priors. For
a stimulating dialogue with J.M. Bernardo on prior probabilities see [29] (don’t miss the
comments on this dialogue by D.R. Cox, A.P. Dawid, J.K. Ghosh and D. Lindley in the same
issue). In any case, it is important to select the prior carefully, and it seems advisable to
investigate the dependency of the model selection on the prior.
The calculation of the evidence (eq. (5)) can be quite challenging. Friel & Wyse [30] provide
a review of different techniques. One of the first approximations for the evidence is due to
6We will comment on Jeffreys’ scale in section 3; see also footnote 11.
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Schwarz [31]. Asymptotically he arrives at the so called Bayesian Information Criterium7
(see [33] for a detailed derivation)
BIC(f) = −2
N∑
i=1
log pf (di |θA) +K log N. (10)
If we compare models, a smaller value of the BIC is better. The marginalised likelihood
pf (di |θA) used in eq. (10) is obtained by fixing di = (xi, yi) and integrating over the remaining
d[i] = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xi−1, yi−1), (xi+1, yi+1), . . . , (xN , yN ))T ,
pf (di |θ) =
∫
pf (d |θ) dd[i]. (11)
For a Gaussian likelihood with covariance matrix Σ as in eq. (1), the integration can be readily
performed and the marginalised likelihood is a one dimensional Gaussian with variance Σii.
Beyond this asymptotic approach, several numerical techniques are currently used to cal-
culate the evidence. In low dimensional parameter spaces a direct integration using standard
numerical methods is sometimes possible. In cosmology a method derived from the ideas of
Chib [34] has been used to estimate the evidence from a given MCMC chain [35, 36]. With
nested sampling one estimates the evidence directly [37]. Several implementations of this ap-
proach are currently in use (see e.g. [38] and [39] and references therein). Kilbinger et al. [40]
suggest a population Monte Carlo method to calculate the evidence. Another approach to
estimate the Bayes factor is via the Savage-Dickey density ratio [41]. Comparisons of further
numerical methods are discussed by [42], [43], and [30].
2.4 Information theoretic approach to model selection
The information theoretic approach is based on the concept of minimising the distance be-
tween the distribution of the model and the distribution of the data. We assume that some
observational data d is drawn at random from the true but unknown distribution with prob-
ability density pT (d). From our model f and the data d = {di}Ni=1 we construct a predictive
distribution pp,f (d) for a single new observation d. Several possibilities for such a predictive
distribution exist and we will discuss the classical and the Bayesian approach. For now we
assume that we know such a predictive distribution pp,f (d) for our model f which we want
to compare to the true distribution pT (d). We measure the discrepancy between the two
distributions using the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (see the appendix A)
D(pT | pp,f ) =
∫
pT (d) log
pT (d)
pp,f (d)
dd
=
∫
pT (d) log pT (d) dd−
∫
pT (d) log pp,f (d) dd. (12)
For model selection we rank the models f and g according to the value of D(pT | pp,f ) and
D(pT | pp,g) — the smaller the better.
7This name Bayesian information criterium is unfortunate, no information theory is involved here. Burn-
ham & Anderson [32] argue that the information theoretically motivated AIC (see next section) is a Bayesian
procedure with a special prior.
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2.4.1 Classical information theoretic approach
In the classical information theoretic approach to model selection the predictive likelihood is
used as the predictive distribution. This leads to the so called Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC, see [44, 45]). Applications of the AIC in cosmology are discussed in [46] and [47].
Although several definitions of a predictive likelihood exist (see [48] for a review) we follow [45]
and use the marginalised likelihood eq. (11) as the predictive likelihood pp,f (d) ≡ pf (d |θ?).
This is the likelihood of a new data point d assuming the maximum likelihood estimate θ?
of the parameters. This is already a well defined approach if d is a simple random variable.
However in our regression setting we have d = (x, y) and we compare the predictions of the
model f(x,θ) to the observed value y. For each of the observed data points di = (xi, yi)
we know the uncertainties of the measurements entering the likelihood (compare eq. (1) and
eq. (11)). But how do we calculate pf (d |θ?) for a d 6= di? At a first glance it seems necessary
to introduce an additional model for the uncertainties. As an example we could interpolate
between neighbouring values of the marginalised likelihood (eq. (11)) to determine pf (d |θ?).
Fortunately we will see below, that this is not necessary since we evaluate pf (d |θ) only at
d = di = (xi, yi).
Let us start with the derivation of the AIC (following loosely [49]). The first term on the
second line in eq. (12) does not depend on the model f . The second term is the expected log
likelihood for the model f for all possible data
η(f) =
∫
log pp,f (d) pT (d)dd =
∫
log pf (d |θ?) dFT (d). (13)
This expectation is calculated using the true cumulative distribution FT . Unfortunately the
true cumulative distribution FT is unknown. From the observational data d = (xi, yi)
N
i=1 it is
always possible to construct the empirical cumulative distribution function FT,N (d) as a sum
of step functions (see appendix A). Then an estimate of the expected log likelihood η(f) is
given by
η̂(f) =
∫
log pf (d |θ?) dFT,N (d) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log pf (di |θ?), (14)
where we used dFT,N (d) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δdi(d)dd (compare eq. (32)). Since we estimated the best
parameter θ? from the same dataset we use to construct the empirical distribution function
FT,N (d), the η̂(f) is a biased estimate of η(f). The expected bias of η̂(f) is
b(f) =
∫
(η̂(f)− η(f)) dFT (15)
and the bias corrected expected log likelihood (the second term in eq. (12)) is
η̂(f)− b(f). (16)
Clearly, this only shifts the problem from η̂(f) to b(f). Assuming that the true distribution pT
is part of the family of distributions pf (z |θ) and that θ? is a maximum likelihood estimate,
Akaike [44] shows that b(f) asymptotically has the form K/N , with K the dimension of the
parameter space and N the number of data points. Rescaling this approximate expression of
8
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eq. (16) by −2N we arrive at the Akaike Information Criterium8
AIC(f) = −2N (η̂(f)−K/N) = −2
N∑
i=1
log pf (di |θ?) + 2K. (17)
The model with the smaller value of the AIC is favoured. In Appendix B.1 we detail the
bootstrap method of Konishi & Kitagawa [49] to obtain an estimate b˜(f) for the bias b(f).
This allows the definition of the Extended Information Criterium [49,50]
EIC(f) = −2N
(
η̂(f)− b˜(f)
)
. (18)
The model with the smaller value of the EIC is favoured.
A comparison of eq. (17) with eq. (10) shows that the AIC and the BIC differ in how they
disfavour high dimensional parameter spaces. These terms are sometimes called Ockham’s
razor terms. Keep in mind that the derivations of the AIC and the BIC start from different
principles: the BIC starts from the evidence and the AIC from the proximity of a model to
the true distribution. Several extensions and “corrections” to the AIC have been proposed
(see for example [51]). A corrected AIC, better suited for smaller sample sizes, was derived
by [52] (see [53] for a unifying derivation of AIC and AICc).
AICc(f) = −2
N∑
i=1
log pf (di |θ?) + 2K N −K − 1
N
. (19)
Several of the assumptions, entering the derivation of the AIC, can be relaxed and the esti-
mates of the bias b(f) can be improved (see [49] for a summary). Indeed θ? need not be a
maximum likelihood estimate; the asymptotic of b(f) is known for Fisher consistent estimates
θ? and also for MAP estimates θA, as obtained from a Bayesian parameter estimation proce-
dure. However we are only aware of the bootstrap procedure discussed by [49,50] as a direct
numerical approach to estimate η(f) (see appendix B.1).
2.4.2 Bayesian information theoretic approach
In the classical approach we use the best fit marginalised likelihood pf (d |θ?) as the pre-
dictive distribution. In a Bayesian approach we use the posterior predictive distribution
pp,f (d) ≡ pppd,f (d). With the posterior distribution pf (θ |d) for the parameters given in
eq. (4) and the marginalised likelihood pf (d |θ) from eq. (11) we can define the posterior pre-
dictive distribution
pppd,f (d) =
∫
pf (d |θ) pf (θ |d) dθ. (20)
With pppd,f (d) in eq. (12) we compare the posterior predictive distribution to the true distri-
bution pT (d) using the KL-divergence:
D(pT | pppd,f ) =
∫
pT (d) log pT (d) dd −
∫
pT (d) log
(∫
pf (d |θ) pf (θ |d) dθ
)
dd. (21)
8We follow the convention used by H. Akaike [44].
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The first term does not depend on the model f and the last term in eq. (21) is
κ(f) =
∫
log
(∫
pf (d |θ) pf (θ |d) dθ
)
dFT (d). (22)
We follow the strategy from Sect. 2.4.1 and insert the empirical distribution function FT,N (d)
for FT (d) and obtain
κ̂(f) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(∫
pf (di |θ) pf (θ |d) dθ
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
log (Epost [pf (di |θ)]) , (23)
where we expressed integral over pf (di |θ) in parameter space as the expectation value Epost[·]
with respect to the posterior distribution pf (θ |d) of the parameters. We can proceed similar
to the classical approach and rescale with −2N to obtain the Bayesian Predictive Information
Criterium9
BPIC(f) = −2N κ̂(f) (24)
The model with the smaller value of the BPIC is favoured. As discussed in section 2.3 the value
of the BPIC depends on the chosen prior. The expectation Epost [pf (di |θ)] can be evaluated
with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We start with one chain simulating
draws from pf (θ |d). Only this chain is needed to calculate an estimate of Epost [pf (di |θ)]
for each of the data points di. Contrary to section 2.4.1 we do not use a point estimate in
the calculation of κ̂(f). Therefore we think that a bias is not important in the calculation
of the BPIC(f). Similar biases in the closely related leave-one-out cross-validation are also
considered negligible [54].
2.5 Other methods
A few other methods for model selection are in use. To compensate the shortcomings of ordi-
nary p–values [14], posterior [55, 56] or calibrated p–values [57] have been suggested. Closely
related to the Bayes factor is the relative belief ratio which measures the belief gained over
the prior after an observation (see [58]). Seehars et al. [59] use the KL-divergence to quantify
the information gained from new data sets and define the “surprise”. The Deviance Informa-
tion Criterium (DIC) was constructed by Spiegelhalter et al. [60] as a revised version of the
AIC (see [61] and [62]). Although the DIC is popular, there is some criticism (see [63] for
a summary). The derivation of the AIC [44], as sketched in section 2.4.1, assumes that the
parametric models are regular10. For typical applications in cosmology, as given in section 3,
this is the case. However models defined by multilayered neural networks are generically sin-
gular. For singular models Watanabe derived the Widely Applicable Information Criterium
(WAIC, [64]). With cross-validation we split the data set. A training sample is used to de-
termine the optimal parameters of the model and the remaining part (the validation sample)
is used for estimating the discrepancy between the optimised model and the data. Then one
selects the model with the smallest discrepancy (see [65] for a survey). Gelman et al. [61]
compare the AIC, DIC, WAIC and cross-validation in a variety of situations. If one is inter-
ested in the estimates and the uncertainties of common parameters in nested or overlapping
9Albeit using a different approach for the derivation, this BPIC is similar to leave-one-out cross-validation
[54].
10A statistical parametric model is regular if its Fisher matrix is positive definite.
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models, Bayesian model averaging could be a solution [66,67]. In the introduction we mention
Ockham’s razor and the principle of parsimony. This can be formalised by assigning the algo-
rithmic complexity as a unique measure to the model describing the data [68]. Typically one is
not able to calculate the algorithmic complexity, but one can estimate the so called minimum
description length (MDL, [69]). In its asymptotic form the MDL is similar to the AIC and
BIC with yet another Ockham’s razor term. The approach from complexity theory and from
information theory seem to be closely related, but this is an open issue (see also [70]).
3 An application – the expansion history of the Universe
We illustrate these approaches to model selection by a classical example from cosmology: the
accelerating expansion of the Universe as determined from redshift and luminosity measure-
ments of supernovae [71]. The question we address is whether this data allows for a more
detailed look at the expansion history of the universe and specifically if we can decide between
the ΛCDM and the wCDM model.
A supernova type Ia (SN Ia) is a stellar explosion with a well defined luminosity [72]. In
astronomy the absolute luminosity is typically specified in logarithmic units, the absolute
magnitude MB in a given frequency range, here the B-band. The observed flux is measured
by the apparent magnitude mB (again in logarithmic units). The distance modulus is defined
as µ := mB −MB. The redshift z of the supernova or of the hosting galaxy is measured
spectroscopically. In a homogeneous and isotropic universe model the distance modulus –
redshift relation can be calculated. Depending on the matter content of the Universe we get
µ(z,θ) = 5 log10 dL(z,θ) + 25, (25)
with luminosity distance dL in Mpc and the redshift z of the supernova. The model de-
pendence enters through the luminosity distance dL(z,θ) with the parameters θ. We do not
pursue an exhaustive investigation of the currently fashionable cosmological models and there-
fore fix some of the otherwise free parameters. Consider Nicola et al. [73] and Raveri & Hu [74]
for a comparison of more models using comprehensive data sets. We assume a spatially flat
Universe (Ωk = 0) and choose H0 = 70kms
−1Mpc−1 compatible with the data from the
Union 2.1 sample [75], but slightly larger than the Planck value [76]. Also if we consider only
supernovae, the value of the Hubble parameter is completely degenerate with the absolute
magnitude. The overall scale is given by the Hubble distance dH =
c
Ho
= 4.28 Gpc, with c
the speed of light. We consider two cosmological models:
1) The ΛCDM model with one parameter, the dimensionless density parameter Ωm. Since
we assume a flat background we have 0 ≤ Ωm ≤ 1 and ΩΛ = 1− Ωm for the cosmological
constant term. The luminosity distance is given by (see e.g. [77])
dL(z,Ωm) = dH (1 + z)
∫ z
o
dz′√
Ωm(1 + z′)3 + ΩΛ
. (26)
2) The flat wCDM model, with a constant equation of state p = w% for the dark energy
component, has two free parameters (Ωm, w). The density parameter obeys 0 ≤ Ωm ≤
1 and the cosmological term ΩΛ = 1 − Ωm at present. The time dependence of the
cosmological term is parametrised using w and the luminosity distance is then
dL(z,Ωm, w) = dH (1 + z)
∫ z
o
dz′√
Ωm(1 + z′)3 + ΩΛ(1 + z′)3(1+w)
. (27)
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Figure 2: The redshift z plotted versus distance modulus µ for the SN 1a data together with
the fits for the ΛCDM model (solid blue line) and the wCDM model (dashed red line).
The observational data di = (zi, µi) are the redshift zi and the distance moduli µi of
SN Ia. In the Union 2.1 sample we have N = 580 such observations from SN Ia together with
an estimate σµ,i of the uncertainty of each distance modulus [75,78]. Assuming a cosmological
model we calculate the distance modulus µi given the redshift zi depending on the cosmological
parameters of the model. The likelihood is the starting point for all the approaches to model
selection we discussed. Similar to eq. (1) we assume a Gaussian likelihood. For the flat ΛCDM
model we have
pΛ(d |Ωm) = 1√
(2pi)N
∏N
i=1 σ
2
µ,i
exp
(
−1
2
N∑
i=1
(µi − µ(zi,Ωm))2
σ2µ,i
)
(28)
with d = (zi, µi)
N
i=1 and the distance modulus µ(zi,Ωm) calculated from the model. This
likelihood with a diagonal covariance matrix and model independent variances is a simplifica-
tion. Our goal here is to provide an illustrative example for the different approaches to model
selection. In appendix C we will discuss the statistical errors and systematic biases in more
detail. For the marginalised likelihood evaluated at di we have from eq. (11)
pΛ(di |Ωm) = 1√
2piσ2µ,i
exp
(
−1
2
(µi − µ(zi,Ωm))2
σ2µ,i
)
. (29)
The likelihood pw(d |Ωm, w) and marginalised likelihood pw(di |Ωm, w) of the wCDM model
are defined analogously. In the Bayesian analysis we need to specify the priors. We assume a
uniform distribution on [0, 1] for Ωm and a uniform distribution on [−2, 0] for w. Before we
turn to model selection, we estimate the parameters. For the flat ΛCDM model we obtain
Ωm = 0.278 ± 0.007. This estimate is virtually identical between the least square fit, the
maximum likelihood and the MAP estimate. The error shown is the standard deviation of
12
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the posterior distribution. Similarly, we obtain Ωm = 0.279±0.06 and w = −1.0±0.13 in the
wCDM model. Remember, we fixed H0 and only consider spatially flat cosmological models.
In figure 2 we show the data points together with the prediction of the two models, using the
best fit values of the parameters respectively. In this plot the curves from the two models are
lying indistinguishably on top of each other.
Now we apply all the methods for model selection described previously. In appendix B
we give details on the numerical procedures used. First we summarise the results, later on we
will put them in perspective by investigating the fluctuations of the results.
Goodness of fit: In the ΛCDM model we have a χ2red(Λ) = 0.971 resulting in a p–value
of 0.68 and in the wCDM model a χ2red(w) = 0.973 with a p–value of 0.67. Neither the
ΛCDM nor the wCDM model can be rejected.
Likelihood ratio test: From the maxima of the likelihoods of both models we compute
the likelihood ratio L and then λ = −2 logL = 0.000948 . This results in a p–value of
1−G1(λ) = 0.975. Clearly we cannot reject the ΛCDM in favour of the wCDM model.
Bayesian approach: For the ΛCDM model we obtain a BICΛ = −231.1 and for the wCDM
model a BICw = −224.8. Hence we should prefer the ΛCDM model. The evidence ratio
is BΛw =
pΛ(d)
pw(d)
= 5.45 > 1, and again we should prefer the ΛCDM model.
Classical information theoretic approach: For the ΛCDM model we have an AICΛ =
−235.5 and for the wCDM model an AICw = −233.5. Hence we should prefer the
ΛCDM model. For the ΛCDM model we get EICΛ = −239.3 and for the wCDM model
EICw = −241.0. This suggests that we should prefer the wCDM model.
Bayesian information theoretic approach: We obtain a BPICΛ = −237.5 for the ΛCDM
model and a BPICw = −237.3 for the wCDM model. Therefore the ΛCDM model is
preferred over the wCDM model.
3.1 Stability of the model selection
Neither using the least-square results nor with the likelihood ratio test we arrive at a definite
conclusion. Both models fit the data, and we also cannot rule out ΛCDM or the wCDM model.
In the Bayesian approach often Jeffereys’ [25] scale is employed to express the numerical value
of the evidence ratio BΛw in words
11. Hence with BΛw = 5.4 we have “substantial evidence”
to support the ΛCDM over the wCDM. However such a “universal” scale is disputed (see
e.g. [79] or [80]). Similarly, the mere comparison of numbers, like we did with the AIC, BIC,
EIC and BPIC, is not satisfying. A scale is missing.
We do not want to propose a universal scale, which probably does not exist, but we
suggest a model dependent approach to investigate the stability of our model selection. As
a concrete example, consider the Bayesian information theoretic approach and the values of
BPICΛ = −237.5 and BPICw = −237.3 for the ΛCDM and the wCDM model, respectively.
To see whether this difference is important we repeatedly generate artificial data sets and
calculate the BPICΛ for each of these data sets. This allows us to estimate the dispersion
∆BPICΛ . Clearly the fluctuations depend on how we generate our artificial data set. We start
with the Union 2.1 sample [75] and keep the redshift zi and the uncertainty σµ,i fixed and
11Jeffreys’ scale for the evidence ratio B translated to our conventions reads (see appendix B in [25]): B < 1:
negative evidence; 1 ≤ B < √10: barely worth mentioning; √10 ≤ B < 10: substantial; 10 ≤ B < 103/2:
strong; 103/2 ≤ B < 100: very strong, 100 ≤ B: decisive evidence.
12One can show that the p–values obtained from these mock-samples are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
therefore the “∆” is not really informative.
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Table 1: A summary of the results from the Union 2.1 data set together with the dispersion
estimated from the ΛCDM mock samples as described in the text.
results from the difference “∆” from
Union 2.1 sample “|Λ− w|” the mocks
pΛ 0.68 0.01 0.458 12
pw 0.67
p likelihood ratio 0.975 — 0.565 12
BΛw 5.45 — 3.41
BICΛ -231.1 6.3 42.2
BICw -224.8
AICΛ -235.5 2.0 42.2
AICw -233.5
EICΛ -239.3 1.7 39.4
EICw -241.0
BPICΛ -237.5 0.2 42.9
BPICw -237.3
generate generate randomised distance moduli µ˜i for each of the supernovae, The µ˜i fluctuate
around the prediction of the ΛCDM model according to
µ˜i = 5 log dL(zi,Ωm = 0.278) + 25 + si, (30)
where si is a random number, normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation
σµ,i. This gives us an artificial data set (zi, µ˜i, σµ,i)
580
i=1. For one hundred of these artificial data
sets we calculate the BPIC and estimate the dispersion of the BPIC using the mid-spread13
∆BPICΛ = 42.9. This dispersion estimate ∆BPICΛ is two orders of magnitude larger than the
difference between BPICΛ and BPICw. Hence, using the BPIC we can not select one of the
models. This is not a full evaluation of the fluctuations present in the model, but it helps us to
assess the relevance of our results in a model dependent way (see also appendixC). The results
from the Union 2.1 sample and the dispersion estimates for the p–values, the BΛw, BIC, AIC,
EIC, BPIC are summarised in table 1. The dispersions “∆” are always significantly larger
than the observed differences between the ΛCDM and wCDM models. Fixing levels or using
universal scales for the various criteria can hence be misleading (see also [74,81]).
We may considers the data as a realisation of a random process. Then it is quite natural to
quantify the dispersions in this model dependent way. All the key figures are random variables
depending on the model and the data set (considered as a random realisation). As a showcase
we give the empirical distributions of all the relevant quantities for model selection within this
ΛCDM mock scenario in figure 3. But one should be aware, that in classical statistics such a
mock scenario is unnatural12. The p–value is considered a fixed number, only depending on
the data set under investigation and the likelihood.
As mentioned in section 2.3 we study the dependence on the priors. We calculate the Bayes
factor BΛw and the BPIC for a series of priors. Still we restrict the parameters to the ranges
13The mid-spread, or inter quartile range, is defined as the difference between 75th and 25th percentiles.
It is a robust estimator of dispersion. For a Gaussian distribution the mid-spread is approximately 1.34 times
the standard deviation.
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Figure 3: The normalised frequency distribution of the relevant quantities for model selection
obtained from (at least) 100 ΛCDM mock samples. The vertical lines mark the values obtained
from the Union 2.1 sample (compare table 1) for the ΛCDM (red) and wCDM model (dashed
black). The p-value from the likelihood ratio test and the Bayes factor are already comparative
quantities and only one black vertical line is shown.
Ωm ∈ [0, 1] and w ∈ [−2, 0], but in addition to the flat distribution we use Jeffreys’ prior
(a suitably rescaled Beta(1/2,1/2) distribution) and a series of truncated and renormalised
Gaussian distributions. For the truncated Gaussian distributions we vary the width from
almost flat on the intervals to strongly peaked and we use two different mean values, one
is centred on the “correct” value (the MAP estimate). For all these priors the posterior
distributions are very similar and the MAP estimates agree within the fluctuations. The
BPICΛ from the Bayesian information theoretic approach ranges from -237.4450 to -237.4485
for these priors. Only in the extreme cases, where we have negligible overlap between the
prior and the posterior distribution, we get a value outside this range. Hence, if the prior is
sufficiently broad and shows some overlap with the posterior distribution we get consistent
results for the BPIC irrespective of the prior. A similar behaviour is observed for the Bayes
factor BΛw.
Our conclusion comes as little surprise (see e.g. [82]): using the Union 2.1 data set we
cannot decide whether the ΛCDM or the wCDM model should be preferred. Also keep in
mind that we use a simplified ansatz for the likelihood. See appendix C for further notes.
4 Discussion of the methods
In physics the construction of models is guided by basic principles (conservation laws, sym-
metries, etc.). Adding another term, as illustrated in Fig. 1 in the introduction, is often not
acceptable because one would violate these principles. For statistical applications in engi-
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neering or the social sciences this is often not a major concern. Model selection is used as
a criterium to decide whether one should introduce new parameters and new dependencies.
Ockham’s razor suggests that one should go for the simpler model. However simplicity needs
to be quantified (see Sober [83]). The dimension of the parameter space immediately comes
to mind as such a measure of simplicity. But the dimension is only a rough and sometimes
misleading measure of parsimony (see e.g. [11], and also compare Fig. 1). The goodness of fit,
the likelihood ratio, the evidence ratio, or the KL-divergence from the information theoretic
approaches are operationally well defined procedures for model selection. They allow quanti-
tative arguments beyond mere qualitative arguments. In section 2 we describe these methods
and in section 3 we apply them to a problem from cosmology. Typically one would not want
to apply all of them. Neither from the mathematical definitions nor from the data analysis
a clear recommendation emerges. We will now present some philosophical arguments and
finally recommend the information theoretical approach. First the methods, given in Sect. 2,
are briefly summarised before we critically discuss them:
- With the goodness of fit one ranks models according to their ability to fit the data points.
- With the likelihood ratio you compare the probabilities of your data given the best fitting
models. Together with a predefined significance level the likelihood ratio allows you to
discard a given model (your null hypothesis) in favour of the alternative model.
- In a Bayesian model comparison you use the evidence ratio to compare the joint probabilities
of the models and the data. This depends on the likelihood and the prior.
- In the classical information theoretic approach you measure how good the best fitting models
are at predicting new data.
- In the Bayesian information theoretic approach you measure how good the posterior pre-
dictive distributions of the models are at predicting new data.
The “goodness of fit” based on the χ2f,red is sometimes used for model selection. The major
shortcoming is that the χ2f,red does not factor in any contributions from the false negative rate
(compare appendix A). If we specify a second model and assume a Gaussian error model as
well as independent sampling, the difference χ2f − χ2g is related to the likelihood ratio as used
in the likelihood ratio test.
Although the likelihood ratio test and the Bayesian model selection derive from quite
different approaches towards statistical analysis, they both assume that the true model is
among the considered models (see also [54]). Then you either discard the false models via
tests, or you determine the most probable model. The information theoretic approach is
different. There one accepts that a model is an approximation and one tries to identify the
model which is closest to the true empirical distribution. This approach allows us to predict
new data in the best possible way.
Similarly Wit et al. [84] discuss the following two questions (see also [54]): i) which
modelling procedure will, with sufficient data, identify the true model? or ii) based on the
data, which model lies closest to the true model? They conclude indecisively: asking different
questions leads to different approaches for model selection. However one is able to go beyond
this neutral statement. Consider the following aphorism attributed to G. Box [85]: “all
models are wrong”. In physics one would not use the term “wrong”. Physical models have
their range of applicability. We know that Newtonian gravity is failing on large scales and
we assume that general relativity is failing on very small scales. However both have their
range of applicability and we successfully compare their predictions with measurements and
observations. Presumably all models in physics, at least the models which may be confronted
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with data, are effective models (see for example the discussion of effective field theories in [86]).
Hence, methods of model selection, which try to identify the true model are deceptive. We
know from the outset that our models are “wrong”. This is a bit nitpicking, since we know
about the range of applicability of our models. Nevertheless it is advisable to respect this
situation from the beginning and use the information theoretic approach. There we try to
find the best approximate, not necessarily the true model. This becomes especially important
in cosmology, where new observations always add to the existing data. For example new
observations of galaxies are added to the already known galaxy catalogues. The Universe
contains the galaxy distribution and probabilistic physical models are used to describe it
(see [87]). Again, we seek the best approximating model.
Now consider another argument from the philosophy of science (see also [88]). Bayesian
updating is sometimes presented as the only relevant way of plausible reasoning in science
(Jaynes [89]). This would favour methods based on the Bayesian evidence and the evidence
ratio for model selection. However scientists devise new models and compare them to data.
Either the data supports the model or sometimes allows a rejection (falsification). This cycle
has been put forward by Popper [90] and refined by Lakatosz [91]. Actually this approach
seems to be too restrictive to describe the scientific growth of knowledge as outlined by
Feyerabend [92] and Kuhn [93]. Laudan [94] argues that the contextual problem solving
effectiveness is the key ingredient for a successful description of scientific progress (compare
also with [95]). In other words, one seeks the model which offers the most effective way to
describe new data. This is the idea behind the information theoretic approach.
Up to now we argued for the information theoretic approach in general but did not differen-
tiate between the classical and the Bayesian version. As we already stated in the introduction
we prefer the Bayesian approach if the prior is well specified. We do not want to repeat
the arguments exchanged in the discussion of the Bayesian versus the classical approach to
statistics. Perhaps the articles by Cousins [2] and Efron [96], including the comments di-
rectly following Efron’s article, may serve as an introduction to this discussion. A pragmatic
reconciliation is suggested by Kass [97] in his “big picture”.
So far we presented methods for the comparison of models based on their ability to fit
or predict observational data. There are further criteria we can and should employ to assess
physical models. Independent from the observational data, new models (hopefully) make
predictions and solve conceptual problems. They can be judged by their effectiveness to solve
such problems [94]. This is not a quantitative endeavour, one has to present arguments for
and against models, often based on the foundations of the models, or criticising the viability
of the approximations used. But in the end physical models have to stand the comparison
with data [98]. Then the methods of model selection we discuss come into play.
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Figure 4: In the left plot the probability density p
(
χ2f , 20
)
of a χ2–random variable with 20
degrees of freedom is shown. The shaded area marks the probability p = 0.02 of obtaining a
value of χ2f > 35.0. The right plot shows the probability densities of the null hypothesis and
the alternative hypothesis. In this situation we have a false positive rate α = 0.05 (grey) and
a false negative rate β = 0.32 (red).
A Some results from statistics
Statistical tests The theory of hypothesis tests for statistical data analysis was pioneered
by K. Pearson [99]. His goal was to compare the observed frequency distribution of random
events to probabilities from a model. He could show that the test statistic he developed,
asymptotically follows a χ2–distribution. This approach was significantly extended by Fisher
[100]. We follow the practice in physics and name the mean-square calculated in eq. (3) by
χ2f (see e.g. [101] or [4, chap. 40]). This χ
2
f is clearly different from the test statistic used
by Pearson [99]. If we make the strong assumptions that the N data points used in the
calculation of eq. (3) are independent and that the error is Gaussian distributed, then χ2f is
asymptotically following a χ2–distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom (see also [12]).
In this situation a statistical test proceeds in the following way. Our null hypothesis is
that our model with the best parameter θ∗ from the least square fit is correct. Then the
χ2f is calculated using eq. (3). The p–value is given by p = 1 − GN−1
(
χ2f
)
, where Gν is
the cumulative distribution function of a χ2–distributed random variable with ν degrees of
freedom. The p–value is the probability that the data may arise from the null hypothesis
(see section 2.1 for more comments on the p–value). To round up the test we fix a so called
significance level, typically α = 0.05 (also called the “false positive rate” or type I error). If
p < α we may conclude that the null hypothesis (our model) is rejected at the α = 0.05
significance level. The left plot in figure 4 illustrates such a situation.
For the calculation of the false negative rate, specifying the null hypothesis H0 alone is
not sufficient [16]. We have to state an alternative model, the hypothesis H1. Now assume
that H1 is true but H0 has not been rejected (i.e. H0 has been falsely accepted). Given H1
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Figure 5: The cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable to-
gether with the empirical distribution function for N = 30 random realisations.
and the false positive rate α we can calculate the false negative rate β (also called the type II
error) as illustrated in the right plot of Fig. 4. In the goodness of fit approach one does not
specify an alternative model, the hypothesis H1. Hence one is not able to quantify the false
negative rate. As we see in the right plot of Fig. 4 the false negative rate β can be quite large
even for small α.
Empirical distribution function: For simplicity consider a real valued random variable
with probability density p(x) and cumulative distribution function
F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
p(x′)dx′. (31)
Consider N independent random realisations (x1, . . . , xN ) of this random variable. Then the
empirical distribution function is defined as
FN (x) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I[xi,∞)(x). (32)
Here IA(x) is the indicator function of the set A with IA(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and zero for x 6∈ A.
The theorem of Glivenko–Cantelli states that FN (x) converges for N → ∞ towards F (x)
uniformly, this means ‖FN − F‖∞ → 0 almost surely (see [102], and compare figure 5). For
example this theorem guarantees the convergence of the empirical median and quantiles. The
empirical distribution function is analogously defined in higher dimensions. The half–interval
is replaced by a half open rectangle stretching to infinity with the point xi marking the lower
left corner.
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Kullback–Leibler divergence: The Kullback-Leibler (KL)-divergence ( [103], also called
relative entropy)
D(p|q) =
∫
p(z) log
p(z)
q(z)
dz (33)
measures the deviation between the distribution of two random variables with probability
densities p(z) and q(z). The KL-divergence is not symmetric in its arguments (it is not a
distance). For discrete probability distributions the interpretation is straightforward. The
information content in the discrete probability distribution p = {pi}∞i=1 with
∑∞
i=1 pi = 1 is
measured by the (information) entropy [104]
H = −
∞∑
i=1
pi log pi, (34)
then the KL-divergence
D(p|q) =
∞∑
i=1
pi(log pi − log qi) (35)
measures the information lost, if the probability distribution q is used to approximate the
true probability distribution p. This characterisation carries over to the continuum. Up to
a multiplicative constant the KL-divergence is a unique measure of divergence (see [105] for
details).
B Details of the implementation
We have chosen the statistical package R [106] as the basic tool for our computations14. The
results are presented in section 3. Here you find some details about the implementation and
the packages we use.
- We calculate the minimum θ∗ of the χ2 according to eq. (3) using the function nls from the
core of R [106]. The p–values are calculated using the built in χ2–distribution function.
- For the maximum likelihood estimate θ? we use the function mle2 from the package bbmle
[108]. With this θ? we calculate the maximum value of the likelihood pf (d |θ?) which we
use in the computation of the likelihood ratio. And again we use the built in χ2–distribution
function to calculate the p–value for the likelihood ratio test (see section 2.2).
- Since we only consider a one– and a two–dimensional parameter space, we are able to calcu-
late the evidence by direct numerical integration. We use the builtin function integrate and
an adaptive multidimensional integration routine hcubature from the package cubature
[109]. The direct numerical integration gives similar results compared to the quite noisy
and costly results obtained from nested sampling using the package RNested [110]. The
BIC (eq. (10)) is calculated using a function provided in the package bbmle [108].
- For the classical information theoretic approach we first calculate the AIC (see eq. (17))
using functions provided in the bbmle package [108]. To go beyond this asymptotic result we
calculate η̂(f) according to eq. (14). With the bootstrap estimate b˜(f) of the bias b(f) (see
14If you plan to use python you may consider the modules scipy, statsmodels, arviz and pandas,
and see also [107] for CosmoHammer. A helpful page about python implementations for MCMC and
nested sampling is maintained by Matthew Pitkin http://mattpitkin.github.io/samplers-demo/pages/
samplers-samplers-everywhere.
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eq. (15)) we calculate the EIC(f), see eq. (18). In section B.1 we give a detailed description
of this bootstrap procedure due to Konishi and Kitagawa [49]. We use 100k bootstrap
samples to estimate b˜(f).
- We prepare Markov chains with the function metrop from the mcmc package [111]. For
convergence diagnostics and for tuning of the sampler parameters we employ the coda
package [112]. Using Gelman and Rubin’s convergence diagnostic [113] we see that all our
chains converge after at least 1000 steps, even if we start in the extreme points of the
parameter range. For the ΛCDM model we build a chain with a length of 15 Mio steps. We
average the results over 15 steps and use this batched chain for the MAP estimate and to
calculate the BPIC (see next point). For the wCDM model we build a chain with a length
of 30 Mio steps and average the results over 30 steps.
- We calculate the BPIC(f) as described in section 2.4.2. In the ΛCDM model we estimate
for each data point di = (zi, µi)
Epost [pΛ(di |Ωm)] ≈ 1
L
L∑
l=1
pΛ(di |Ωm,l), (36)
from one Markov chain. Here Ωm,l is one state from the Markov chain and L is the length
of the chain. Inserting this estimate of Epost [pΛ(di |Ωm)] into eq. (23) we obtain κ̂Λ as an
average over all the data points. Then we rescale as in eq. (24) to obtain BPICΛ. We
proceed similarly for the BPICw.
You can download an abbreviated version of our code from https://homepages.physik.
uni-muenchen.de/~Martin.Kerscher/software/modelselect/ .
B.1 Bootstrap for b(f)
Before we describe the bootstrap procedure leading to the EIC [49,50] we give a more detailed
definition of the average bias. We augment the notation from Sect. 2.4.1 and express the
expected log likelihood of the model f , the data set d = (xi, yi)
N
i=1, and the cumulative
distribution functions FT as
η(f ;θ?(d), FT ) =
∫
log pf (d |θ?(d)) dFT (d),
where θ?(d) is the best maximum likelihood parameter obtained from the data set d. The
average bias from eq. (15) can be expressed as
b(f) = EFT [η (f ;θ
?(d), FT )− η (f ;θ?(d), FT,N,d)] . (37)
The dependence of the estimated parameters θ?(d) and the empirical distribution function
FT,N,d on the data set d is now explicit. [49, 50] propose a bootstrap procedure to estimate
b(f). First generate bootstrap samples d˜ = (x˜i, y˜i)
N
i=1 from the data by repeatedly drawing
from d with putting back (i.e. sampling from FT,N,d). For each of these bootstrap samples d˜
we have the empirical distribution function F
T,N,d˜
. The bootstrap estimate of b(f), as given
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in eq. (37), is then15
b˜(f) = E˜
[
η
(
f ;θ?(d˜), FT,N,d
)
− η
(
f ;θ?(d˜), F
T,N,d˜
)]
= E˜
 1
N
N∑
i=1
log pf
(
di |θ?(d˜)
)
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
log pf
(
d˜j |θ?(d˜)
) . (38)
The expectation E˜[·] ≡ EFT,N,d [·] is over samples d˜ drawn from FT,N,d. Using M such boot-
strap samples d˜α, α = 1, . . . ,M we can estimate b˜ (f) by
b˜ (f) ≈ 1
MN
M∑
α=1
N∑
i=1
log
 pf
(
di |θ?(d˜α)
)
pf
(
d˜αi |θ?(d˜α)
)
 . (39)
Depending on the estimation procedure for θ?(d˜), such a bootstrap procedure can be time
consuming. Konishi & Kitagawa [49] show that b˜(f) is approximating b(f) for large N .
Furthermore they propose a variance reduction scheme for this bootstrap procedure.
C More on the data analysis
The analysis of the SN Ia data in section 3 serves as an illustrative example for the methods
of model selection. To keep things simple we employ some approximations, specifically we
assume a diagonal covariance matrix in the likelihood and also assume that the variances
are independent from the cosmological model. Below we will try to give justice to the more
complex situation.
The distance moduli µi of the SN Ia are calculated with a (semi) empirical relation from
the observed light curve of the supernova explosion. Several parameters enter this relation
(see [114] for details). In our analysis we use the µi provided in the Union 2.1 compilation
which have been calculated with the best fit parameters. Such a uniform fitting introduces
covariances between the µi. They have been estimated and the Union 2.1 compilation comes
with a non diagonal covariance matrix (see [75] and http://supernova.lbl.gov/Union/). In
a full analysis we would have to include these covariances in the likelihood (compare eq. (1)).
Moreover in a full Bayesian analysis we would include these fitting parameters as independent
parameters and then later marginalise (compare [88]). Further error sources are photometric
zero points, contamination, evolution, Malmquist bias, K-corrections, gravitational lensing,
peculiar velocities, etc. (see [114]). They all contribute to the (co-)variances and have been
estimated in the Union 2.1 compilation [75].
Some of these contributions to the error budget also depend on the cosmological model. For
example the magnification and demagnification of high redshift supernovae by gravitational
lensing depends on the structure growth, which again depends on the cosmological parameters.
This lensing contribution can be estimated for some of the supernovae individually [75] but
often this lensing error is estimated in a statistical sense only [115]. Then probably a self
consistent treatment will be necessary if one aims for higher precision. Also anisotropies
and inhomogeneities in the matter distribution influence the obeservations [116]. A careful
15Please watch where we write d˜ or d.
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Table 2: The values of the relevant quantities for model selection obtained from the Union 2.1
sample after scaling the uncertainties σµ,i by a factor C.
C 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 2
pΛ 0 0 0.684 1 1 1
pw 0 0 0.673 1 1 1
p l-ratio test 0.951 0.969 0.975 0.980 0.984 0.988
BΛw 23.3 6.82 5.45 4.54 3.66 2.41
BICΛ 651.5 -173.7 -231.1 -191 -73.1 151.3
BICw 657.9 -167.4 -224.8 -185 -66.8 157.6
AICΛ 647.1 -178.1 -235.5 -195.8 -77.5 146.9
AICw 649.1 -176.1 -233.5 -193.8 -75.5 148.9
EICΛ 641.5 -181.4 -239.2 -198.2 -79.7 353.2
EICw 632.1 -185.4 -241.0 -200.3 -81.2 352.4
BPICΛ 643.9 -180.2 -237.5 -197.7 -79.3 145.1
BPICw 641.9 -180.5 -237.3 -197.4 -78.9 145.6
determination of the errors will be necessary if one compares with inhomogeneous models
[117–119]. Not only the distance modulus redshift relation but also the errors depend on the
adopted models and have to be quantified.
To get a rough idea how these additional uncertainties influence our results we apply a
uniform scaling factor C to the σµ,i and then repeat the analysis from section 3. As can be
seen from table 2 the values of the relevant quantities change, but compared to the dispersion
estimates from the mock samples shown in table 1, the observed differences between the ΛCDM
and the wCDM model remain small.
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